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SUMMARY OF ARGOMENT 
In its brief, the State asserts that some lesser standard 
should govern a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of 
its case rather than, as appellant maintains, that the evidence 
must be sufficient to sustain a guilty finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Further, the State contends that the trial court was not 
required to consider the evidence of self-defense introduced in 
the State's own case in ruling on the motion for judgment of 
acquittal. 
As demonstrated in our initial brief, and as further 
explained below, it is clear that the proper, and only, legal 
standard for judging a motion challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence, regardless of when such a motion is made, is whether 
there was sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could 
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trier of fact had to 
have a reasonable doubt based on the evidence, the Court is 
required to grant the motion. Most importantly, the question in 
this case is whether the trial court's decision on this issue was 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Significantly, the 
State does not, and cannot, contend either that it met the legal 
standard articulated by appellant or that the trial court's 
decision, under that standard, was not against the clear weight of 
the evidence. Rather, the State bases its position entirely on 
the faulty premise that a "prima facie" case means something less 
than evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Under the unusual circumstances of this case, 
the motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted and 
the conviction must be reversed. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
The State Incorrectly and Incompletely Misstates 
the Proper Test Governing the Motion for Judgment 
of Acquittal Made in This Case. 
In an effort to salvage an invalid conviction based on in-
sufficient evidence, the State has misstated and apparently mis-
understood the test to be applied in ruling on a motion for judg-
ment of acquittal. The State's error is two-fold. First, the 
State apparently suggests that the "prima facie" test is some 
lesser civil standard which does not require the State to present 
sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt in order to defeat a motion for judgment of acquittal 
in criminal cases. Second, the State contends that the trial 
court, in ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, is 
actually permitted to ignore evidence of self-defense introduced 
by the State in its own case-in-chief. Indeed, in this case, such 
overwhelming evidence was the only evidence of what occurred on 
the night in question. Both propositions are clearly erroneous. 
With regard to the first point, the State maintains that the 
often-quoted requirement to establish a "prima facie" case at the 
close of its case differs quantitatively and legally from the 
requirement to present sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at the close of its case. See 
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Brief for Respondent at 16. Indeed, while the State argues it met 
the "prima facie" test, it does not contend that it satisfied the 
test set forth by appellant as the correct one. Appellant submits 
that the State distorts the term "prima facie" and, in doing so, 
misunderstands the relevant test. 
As a threshold matter, it is well-settled that the standard 
to be applied in ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is 
the same regardless of when made, i.e., at the close of the govern-
ment's case, at the close of all the evidence or at the appellate 
level in reviewing denial of the motion. See e.g. , Burks v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1978); United States v. Artuso, 
618 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980); United 
States v. Burns, 597 F.2d 939, 941 (5th Cir. 1979). At all times, 
the single standard is whether there was sufficient evidence to 
permit a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The fundamental flaw in the State's argument is created by 
its misuse of the term "prima facie" without a proper understand-
ing of the context in which it has been used by the courts. 
Contrary to the State's astonishing suggestion, reference to the 
term "prima facie," in cases such as State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 
216, 218 (Utah 1976), does not, and cannot, constitutionally mean 
that a lesser civil standard applies to the prosecution's burden 
of proof in criminal cases. Rather, the requirement to establish 
a prima facie case means the same in Utah as elsewhere, i.e. the 
prosecution must present sufficient evidence, which, if un-
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challenged and unrebutted, would sustain, although not compel, a 
finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at the close of its 
case-in-chief. See United States v. Coleman, 501 F.2d 342, 345 
(10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 243 (2d 
Cir. 1972). 
If the State does not present sufficient evidence to sustain 
a guilty finding beyond a reasonable doubt at the conclusion of 
its case, i .e. a prima facie case, then a motion for judgment of 
acquittal must be granted. If, and only if, there is sufficient 
evidence at the end of the State's case which, left unrebutted, 
would be sufficient to sustain a guilty finding beyond a reason-
able doubt should the motion be denied. If a reasonable doubt 
must exist, the motion must be granted. See United States v. 
Taylor, supra, 464 F.2d at 243; State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 
(Utah 1983). In the present case, at the close of the State's 
case, there was overwhelming evidence that appellant acted in 
self-defense and, in fact, no evidence that appellant did not act 
in self-defense. The trial court, as the trier of fact, therefore 
must have had at least a reasonable doubt as to whether Mrs. 
Strieby acted in self-defense and its decision on this point was 
clearly against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the 
motion should have been granted. 
The State does not dispute that evidence of self-defense was 
introduced in its case-in-chief or that the only evidence of what 
happened during the decedent's attack was based on appellant's 
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statement to the police which the State chose to introduce in 
evidence. Nor does the State contend that it did, or could, meet 
the legal standard advanced by appellant as the correct test. 
Rather, in an effort to circumvent the proper legal standard which 
compelled a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence, 
the State compounds its earlier analytical error by asserting that 
the trial court was free to totally ignore evidence of self-
defense, which the State introduced in its case-in-chief, because 
absence of self-defense was not a prima facie element of the crime 
charged. 
The fact that absence of self-defense was not a prima facie 
element of homicide was irrelevant to considering the sufficiency 
of the evidence in ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal. 
As the Supreme Court in State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985), 
noted, once the issue of self-defense is raised "whether by the 
defendant's or by the prosecution's evidence," the prosecution has 
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was 
not in self-defense. Id. at 214. This means that if evidence of 
self-defense is introduced during the State's case-in-chief and, 
if such evidence precludes a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt at that point, then a motion for judgment of acquittal must 
be granted. 
Utah's statutory scheme further demonstrates the fallacy of 
the State's position and directly supports appellant's position. 
In that regard, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1978), provides, in 
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part, that a defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be 
innocent "until each element of the offense" is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and, further, it defines the phrase "element of 
the offense." The next statutory provision, Utah Code Ann.y § 
76-1-502 (1978), provides, in relevant part: 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a 
defense: 
(1) By the allegation in an information, 
indictment, or other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the 
case as a result of evidence presented 
at trial, either by the prosecution or 
the defense; or . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that the absence of self-
defense is not a prima facie element of the offense simply means 
that the State does not need to allege absence of self-defense, 
i.e. to expressly negate the defense, in the information. Utah 
Code Ann., § 76-1-502 (1978). That same statute provides, how-
ever, that the State is required to negate the defense if it is an 
issue in the case "as a result of evidence presented at trial, 
either by the prosecution or the defense." Id. In analyzing a 
very similar statutory scheme, one Court has noted that the fact 
that absence of self-defense is not one of the elements included 
in the definition of the offense merely relieves the prosecution 
of the necessity of pleading the absence of self-defense and, 
further, relieves "the State of the time-consuming and unnecessary 
task of alleging and proving negative propositions which may not 
be involved in each case." State v. McCullum, 656 P.2d 1064, 1070 
(Wash. 1983) (en banc). Once the issue is properly raised in the 
State's own case, "the absence of self-defense becomes another 
element of the offense which the State must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt." ![d. (citations omitted). In our case, as in 
McCullum, self-defense was put at issue by the State in its own 
case and it was required, under Knoll and § 76-1-502, to present 
sufficient evidence in its case to sustain a finding of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. It utterly failed to do so. 
The trial court was not free, as the State suggests, to 
ignore the evidence of self-defense presented by the State in its 
own case in considering the motion for judgment of acquittal. The 
fact that the State could not make its case at that point provides 
no justification for ignoring the constitutional principles on 
which the sufficiency test is based. The trial court must 
consider all of the evidence. As demonstrated above, the State's 
bald assertion that "the law does not require the State to prove 
the absence of self-defense in order to survive a motion for a 
directed verdict at the close of the State's case-in-chief" is 
flatly incorrect when evidence of self-defense has been introduced 
by the State in its own case-in-chief. In that case, the State 
must present sufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt, including that a defendant did not act 
in self-defense. If the State fails to do so, as in this case, 
then a motion for judgment of acquittal must be granted. Par-
ticularly when judged by the more liberal standard of reversal 
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governing bench trials,- the trial court's conclusion that no 
reasonable doubt was required was against the clear weight of the 
evidence. Thus, the motion for judgment of acquittal should have 
been granted. 
In summary, the State was required at the close of its case-
in-chief to present sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It failed to do so and the motion 
for judgment of acquittal was improperly denied. 
II. 
The State Largely Ignores the Evidence, 
and the Trial Court's Own Conclusions, in 
Arguing that the Verdict Was Not Against 
the Clear Weight of the Evidence and That a 
Definite Mistake was Not Made in the Verdict. 
At the close of all the evidence, an acquittal was compelled. 
This is especially true since the trial court had "no substantial 
reason to doubt Mrs. Strieby's version" and had "no substantial 
doubt about the reality of [your] fear, Mrs. Strieby, given the 
burly man that your husband was, given his weight and height and 
- As this Court knows, when reviewing jury verdicts, great 
deference is accorded to the opportunity of twelve individuals to 
evaluate the evidence. The test on review is whether there was 
any evidence of substance to allow a reasonable person to find 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That does not mean, of course, 
that a finding of guilt must be compelled by the evidence. See 
State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 n.3 (Utah 1983). In reviewing 
a bench trial, little deference is afforded the decision below and 
the Court must reverse if the ruling is against the clear weight 
of the evidence. Id. 
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given his powerful muscular build." (TR. 321f 323).- Despite 
crediting appellant's version of the facts and the reality of her 
fear, the trial court was required to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that appellant's real fear was not reasonable in order to 
find her guilty. 
This Court is free to reject the trial court's conclusion on 
this point, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did in Commonwealth 
v. Helm, 402 A.2d 500 (Pa. 1979), a case remarkably similar to 
the present one. In Helm, the appellant, charged with murder of 
her boyfriend, was found guilty in a bench trial of manslaughter. 
The prosecution's evidence of the event largely consisted of the 
appellant's statement. IcL at 502. 
In Helm, like the instant case, the trial court accepted the 
appellant's version but found that appellant's fear was not reason-
able. Id. at 503. Thus, the issue on appeal was whether there 
was insufficient evidence to establish her guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. Specifically, appellant contended that she should 
have been acquitted because the evidence raised the self-defense 
issue which the prosecution failed to disprove beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. at 503. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the conviction and 
squarely rejected the trial court's conclusion that appellant's 
- Thus, in this case, it was not necessary to discount 
questions of credibility and demeanor, since the the trial court 
expressly credited appellant's version of the facts. See State v. 
Goodman, supra, 763 P.2d at 787. 
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fear was not reasonable. 1^ 3. at 504. In a portion of its ruling 
which is directly on point here, the Supreme Court noted: 
The trial court's conclusion that appellant 
"could not have believed . . . that it was 
necessary to kill in order to save herself 
from death or great bodily harm," is not a 
finding of fact of the kind that must be 
accepted by an appellate court. Although that 
conclusion may be considered a factual one, it 
is a conclusion which requires that certain 
inferences first be drawn from the basic 
facts. An appellate court is free to reject 
such factual conclusions when they are not 
sustained by the underlying facts. . . . 
Id. at 504 (citations omitted).- In Helm, the Court found that 
the unarmed decedent's provocation was enough to cause a reason-
able belief by appellant that she was in danger of serious bodily 
harm or death, noting that fl[a]t no time did appellant state that 
she did not think herself in danger of serious bodily injury or 
death from Harvey's unprovoked attack on her." Icl. at 504. This 
is exactly like the present case and, in fact, our case is more 
compelling for an acquittal than Helm. Here, Mrs. Strieby testi-
fied, and Dr. Anderson confirmed, that as a result of being 
knocked down and dragged down the stairs on her back and head, she 
was in actual and immediate danger of severe bodily injury or 
death given her broken back and four prior back surgeries. Indeed, 
— Significantly, it appears from the opinion that 
Pennsylvania, unlike Utah, does not have a separate and more 
stringent standard of review for bench trials. Com, v. Helm, 
supra, 402 A.2d at 503. Under Utah law, reversal is even more 
clearly required in our case. 
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Dr. Anderson said that she actually suffered severe bodily injury, 
i.e. a ruptured cervical disk. (TR. at 203). 
Notwithstanding the uncontradicted testimony of Mrs. Strieby 
and Dr. Anderson, the court reached its conclusion based, in large 
part, on the theory that the decedent had paused long enough to 
fix a drink in the kitchen and, therefore, there was a "reasonable 
substantial cessation" in the attack on Mrs. Strieby. (TR. at 324). 
With due respect, the trial court impermissibly dissected the 
evidence in reaching this result. In doing so, its conclusion was 
against the clear weight of the evidence. 
In order to explain the presence of a blue cup and wet spot 
on the stairs, the trial court necessarily concluded beyond a 
reasonable doubt that it was logical for the decedent, in the 
midst of brutally attacking his wife, to stop and fix a drink in 
the kitchen. Appellant strongly maintains that the trial court 
took a speculative leap across a major gap in the evidence. See 
State v. Harmon, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989). To accept 
its view, one must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
drunken, wild man-turned-animal who was pushed into the kitchen 
during a heated and relentless attack on his wife stopped at that 
point to fix another drink. By contrast, what is more logical and 
probable is that the decedent brought a partially filled cup of 
liquor with him from his shop where he had been drinking heavily 
all day and that it fell from his hand at some point during the 
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attack on his wife on the stairs.- Certainly, at least a doubt 
must exist on this issue. 
Moreover, even giving the trial court's speculation on this 
point any probative value, it is clear that the decedent immediate-
ly resumed his vigorous pursuit of appellant up the steps and 
again repeatedly threatened to kill her as he approached her on the 
steps. (TR. at 245-246). This hardly amounts to any cessation in 
hostilities much less a reasonable and substantial cessation in 
his attack. In an effort to support the trial court, the State 
has simply lost sight of the fact that the real issue is not, and 
never was, whether appellant proved that she acted in self-
defense, but whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that she did not act in self-defense. State v. Knoll, supra. 
In that regard, the evidence showed that Mrs. Strieby was not 
only in fear of serious bodily injury or death, but, in fact, 
suffered serious bodily injury from the brutal attack by her 
husband that night. Dr. Mark Anderson testified specifically, in 
view of Mrs. Strieby's previously broken back and four prior back 
surgeries, that dragging her down the stairs on her back and neck 
- This issue never arose during the testimony at trial. In 
the motion for a new trial, appellant squarely addressed it by 
presenting unrebutted evidence that there was no alcohol in the 
house. The trial court commented at the hearing on the motion 
that it did not mean to imply that the decedent necessarily fixed 
an alcoholic drink. (TR. at 354). Appellant submits that the 
post-hoc rationalization by the trial court to support its verdict 
in the face of appellant's affidavit is even more illogical, i.e. , 
that the drunken decedent would stop to fix a non-alcoholic drink 
and carry it up the stairs with him in his continued assault on 
his wife. 
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caused serious bodily injury and could have easily caused her 
death. (TR. at 203-204). 
The clear weight of the evidence at trial established that 
Mrs. Strieby shot the decendent in self-defense to protect herself 
from serious bodily injury or death. Even more importantly, there 
was simply no evidence, much less evidence to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that she did not act in self-defense. 
The State also suggests that appellant should have repeatedly 
tried to leave the house and, further, that the decedent's 
drinking had impaired his physical agility to the point where 
appellant had been temporarily able to avoid his attack. Mrs. 
Strieby testified, however, that she tried to escape from the 
condominium and was unable to do so when the decedent slammed the 
door. (TR. at 241).- Further, the Medical Examiner testified that 
the decedent was no more than a wild animal based on his blood 
alcohol content. (TR. at 120-121). The decedent's drunken state 
may have saved appellant's life by causing him to strike at her 
and miss, but it also made him irrational, wild and unable to stop 
pursuing her in his attempt to seriously injure or kill her. 
As the testimony indicates, on other previous occasions, 
appellant had been able to stop the decedent from beating her. 
- Even though appellant attempted to leave the condominium 
and then twice retreated up the stairs in an effort to escape, she 
had no duty to retreat under Utah law. See State in Interest of 
M. S., 584 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah 1978). 
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However, Mrs. Strieby recognized that the decedent's attacks 
during the terror of that night were different and that her 
husband could not, and would not, stop until he had seriously 
injured her or killed her. (TR. at 243-244). If there was a brief 
cessation in hostilities at all (which there was not), the dece-
dent, because of his irrational and drunken state, quickly 
continued the attack by coming up the stairs and screaming at Mrs. 
Strieby that he was going to kill her. (TR. at 245-246). 
Appellant had already been dragged down the stairs on her 
neck and back causing serious bodily injury. No civilized society 
can require someone in appellant's shoes to become the victim of 
violent outrage committed by a wild, muscular man undeniably out 
of control. The law permitted appellant to take reasonable steps 
under the then existing circumstances and required the State to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt to the contrary. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-402 (1978). When all of the circumstances are 
considered, there is no doubt that a serious mistake has been made 
and that the court's verdict was against the clear weight of the 
evidence. The State has a solemn duty not just to convict, but to 
see that justice is served. Justice in this case requires 
reversal of Mrs. Strieby's conviction. 
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CONCLDSION 
Appellant's conviction must be reversed, or, in the alterna-
tive, the case must be remanded for a new trial. Further, the 
order of restitution should be vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of December, 1989. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
Neil A. Kaplan 
Anneli R. Smith 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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